Leiter's Suspicious Hermeneutics

Just read Leiter's article "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion". I think it's a good article for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it provides a healthy defense of the relevance of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud to analytic philosophy. However, I'm not sure that Leiter needs to provide as much justification for his project as he seems to think he does. In making the case for the importance of a "naturalistic" approach to studying the real causes of human motives and beliefs, he refers us back to Edmund Gettier, who offered what is considered to be a decisive counterexample to the "knowledge=justified true belief" analysis of that concept. I won't get into Gettier here, or my feelings on the significance of his objection, but I will say this: Do we really need Gettier to make the case for the epistemological importance of M., N., and F.? It seems to be me that--even if we use the outmoded "justified true belief" definition--you can just as easily offer reasons for the relevance of the suspicious, naturalistic account. For wouldn't it show, that if I believe something for different reasons than I think I do--that is to say, I believe I have rationally assessed capitalism to be the best and only viable form of human life, when in fact I believe this because I've been indoctrinated by the ruling classes--that my justification, broadly construed, is suspect? Perhaps the old-style analysis of justification would lead to the conclusion that my beliefs are justified, even with such a hidden origin, but that would seem to me to speak to a problem with our theory of justification, not of knowledge itself.