Brian Leiter has an interesting
article up called "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion" in which he tries to make the case for a naturalistic interpretation of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud--and thus their ultimate inclusion withing and relevance to Anglo-American Analytic Philosophy.
In some ways, I find what Leiter is doing appealing. The Analytic/Continental divide in philosophy is ridiculous, and has caused real harm to both sides in many ways, and thus ultimately to the whole endeavor known as "philosophy." Certainly, work that makes stodgy analytic types reconsider such interesting figures as those three is of great value.
But is Leiter's solution really a solution at all? Does reading continental philosophers as naturalists really help us mend this divide, ultimately? I think not--first of all, while I'm certain a convincing case can be (and is, I haven't finished the article) made for such a reading, I think it might overlook a lot that is valuable within those thinkers' works. And what of philosophers who cannot be easily read naturalistically? Are they then the "frauds," the "charlatans" that M, N, and F were until Leiter rescued them by calling them naturalists? Does Leiter really solve the problem of the divide, as he claims, or doesn't he just push the dates a little forward?
The real problem, it seems to me, is not that a naturalistic reading is
wrong--I think that many interesting readings can be made of any truly deep thinker--it's just that it misses the whole point. Philosophy doesn't need an external justification for doing what it does; it will tick right along regardless of its contiguity, or lack thereof, with the natural sciences. Literature needs no such justifying explanation, and whenever one is offered--such as Harold Bloom's claim that one should read because "only deep, constant reading fully establishes and augments an autonomous self"--end up sounding pompous and absurd. The reason is not that a good definition hasn't been found; it's just that there isn't one definition that fits. Philosophy, like literature, is many things to many people; Its inestimable value to human history can't be boiled down to a subservience to science. People call Heidegger a fraud because they think his claims are not false; but isn't inspiring generations of other brilliant philosophically minded people an accomplishment? I suppose the problem is that I see philosophy as an end unto itself, whereas for others it clearly is not, and cannot, be thus. Its only purpose is to serve the greater good, that of augmenting the collection of true propostions.
