Thursday, March 31, 2005

It really doesn't speak well of religions....

When the only thing the major ones can agree on is how much they hate gays. While I realize objectivity in morals is largely an illusion, this is clearly one of the issues where the other side really has absolutely no ground to stand on. Their best arguments come down to "It's gross! Stop!" Sigh.

Saturday, March 26, 2005

Leiter's Suspicious Hermeneutics

Just read Leiter's article "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion". I think it's a good article for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it provides a healthy defense of the relevance of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud to analytic philosophy. However, I'm not sure that Leiter needs to provide as much justification for his project as he seems to think he does. In making the case for the importance of a "naturalistic" approach to studying the real causes of human motives and beliefs, he refers us back to Edmund Gettier, who offered what is considered to be a decisive counterexample to the "knowledge=justified true belief" analysis of that concept. I won't get into Gettier here, or my feelings on the significance of his objection, but I will say this: Do we really need Gettier to make the case for the epistemological importance of M., N., and F.? It seems to be me that--even if we use the outmoded "justified true belief" definition--you can just as easily offer reasons for the relevance of the suspicious, naturalistic account. For wouldn't it show, that if I believe something for different reasons than I think I do--that is to say, I believe I have rationally assessed capitalism to be the best and only viable form of human life, when in fact I believe this because I've been indoctrinated by the ruling classes--that my justification, broadly construed, is suspect? Perhaps the old-style analysis of justification would lead to the conclusion that my beliefs are justified, even with such a hidden origin, but that would seem to me to speak to a problem with our theory of justification, not of knowledge itself.

Thursday, March 24, 2005

Leiter's Naturalistic Project

Brian Leiter has an interesting article up called "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion" in which he tries to make the case for a naturalistic interpretation of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud--and thus their ultimate inclusion withing and relevance to Anglo-American Analytic Philosophy.

In some ways, I find what Leiter is doing appealing. The Analytic/Continental divide in philosophy is ridiculous, and has caused real harm to both sides in many ways, and thus ultimately to the whole endeavor known as "philosophy." Certainly, work that makes stodgy analytic types reconsider such interesting figures as those three is of great value.

But is Leiter's solution really a solution at all? Does reading continental philosophers as naturalists really help us mend this divide, ultimately? I think not--first of all, while I'm certain a convincing case can be (and is, I haven't finished the article) made for such a reading, I think it might overlook a lot that is valuable within those thinkers' works. And what of philosophers who cannot be easily read naturalistically? Are they then the "frauds," the "charlatans" that M, N, and F were until Leiter rescued them by calling them naturalists? Does Leiter really solve the problem of the divide, as he claims, or doesn't he just push the dates a little forward?

The real problem, it seems to me, is not that a naturalistic reading is wrong--I think that many interesting readings can be made of any truly deep thinker--it's just that it misses the whole point. Philosophy doesn't need an external justification for doing what it does; it will tick right along regardless of its contiguity, or lack thereof, with the natural sciences. Literature needs no such justifying explanation, and whenever one is offered--such as Harold Bloom's claim that one should read because "only deep, constant reading fully establishes and augments an autonomous self"--end up sounding pompous and absurd. The reason is not that a good definition hasn't been found; it's just that there isn't one definition that fits. Philosophy, like literature, is many things to many people; Its inestimable value to human history can't be boiled down to a subservience to science. People call Heidegger a fraud because they think his claims are not false; but isn't inspiring generations of other brilliant philosophically minded people an accomplishment? I suppose the problem is that I see philosophy as an end unto itself, whereas for others it clearly is not, and cannot, be thus. Its only purpose is to serve the greater good, that of augmenting the collection of true propostions.

Saturday, March 12, 2005

Entering Legal Academia

Lots of posts on becoming a law professor here. Sigh. It's definitely what I want to do with my life--there definitely is no other career better suited to my interests and inclinations, and it's nice that law professors actually make some money, as opposed to, say, philosophy professors--but it won't be easy. At least I know I actually enjoy working hard, and this year has been good for me as I've been able to become less conflicted about work/relaxing--I see my life much less in terms of such a dichotomy. Now, I am just really, really looking forward to getting this ball rolling. A new set of challenges will be exciting.

Zizek Article

An interesting article by Slavoj Zizek here. The stuff about Heidegger piqued my interest, due to my recent reading. I've read a couple of extremely short summaries of his life, but I still don't really understand his relationship to Nazism--he briefly collaborated, but then fell out of favor with the regime. Was he really sympathetic, or was he just trying to protect himself? Did he change his mind about Hitler? I should read a full length biography at some point...

UPDATE: After reading a bit more, it seems that Heidegger was a true believer, at least for a time. While he fell out of favor, he was definitely on board with the Nazis for a while. Not good.

I Shouldn't Have a Credit Card

On impulse, yesterday I bought five of those little Oxford "A Very Short Introduction To" books. I decided to get one, and then I sort of wanted to get all the ones I'd been desiring. So I got Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Wittgenstein. Hopefully they will prove helpful in my philosophical endeavors...the Heidegger book has been useful so far.

I Want to Learn Ancient Greek

Really. Wouldn't reading Plato and Aristotle in the original be awesome?

Tuesday, March 08, 2005

So Says Ludwig

"Where our language suggests a body and there is none; there, we should like to say, is a spirit."

Reading Continues

Last night, I got to the halfway point in Being and Time, and then started reading some of the Philosophical Investigations. I'm still a bit lost with Heidegger, but Wittgenstein is making more sense to me now than the last time I tried to read his later work. So far, he seems to be arguing for (although, Wittgenstein doesn't argue so much as suggest, imply, ask pointed questions towards) an instrumental conception of language. Sentences, words, etc. are to be viewed only in the context of the language game in which they are used. Makes sense so far.

Concering Heidegger, today I bought a book of his essays that I hope will prove helpful. I'd like to read The Concept of Time, but $25 for a 40-page book is steep. Onward...

Monday, March 07, 2005

I Love Books

My long-term reading project is to read--or at least seriously grapple with--the most important work by each of the major figures of the history of philosophy. My undergraduate education exposed me to Plato and Aristotle, and the major early moderns through Hume. While I know I didn't get as much as I should have out of these philosophers, I figure I should branch out before going back and doing them right. On my own, I've read: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Foucault's Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, and The Birth of Tragedy; Some of Kierkegaard's Either/Or; Wittgenstein's Tractatus; and now I'm working on Heidegger's Being and Time. I also have been reading in Louis Menand's Pragmatism: A Reader. I'm liking William James.

What's most important to do next? I'm thinking I should do Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, as that looks like one of the top two or three books of the twentieth century, in terms of influence. After that, i'll probably check out Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, as he relies on W. and H., both of whom I will have just read. After that--I'm not sure. I've got Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, but smarter people than I have told me it's impossible. Maybe I'll give it a try anyways. I'm also interested in doing more with the Pragmatists, and reading some of Habermas. And then there's all the legal philosophy I want to get familiar with. Hopefully I'll get to it all eventually...Vita Brevis, Libri Longi!

Sein und Zeit

I've been struggling with Heidegger's Being and Time recently, with a little help from a from friend who understands H. better than I do. I feel like I get the gist of what he's trying to say, some of the time, but a lot of it is just going right over my head. Still, perhaps I have to read it once with little comprehension to better understand it later. I'm finding it pretty exciting reading; perhaps that's because it represents a different way of doing philosophy than I'm used to.

My interest in philosophy recently has been pretty meta--that is, I am really interested in the entire history of philosophy, broadly construed, and the whole possibility of a philosophical enterprise. For people who supposedly spend their lives thinking "deeply," professional philosophers that I've met seem fairly uninterested in philosophical questions about philosophy itself--they mostly just take the methodologies given to them by their teachers, journals, whatever and then start plugging away at problems. That's not me. I doubt I'll be able to contribute something to "Philosophy," in the broad sense, but at the very least I want to have some conception of how the whole history of the field hangs together.

Friday, March 04, 2005

Bloggers Are Really, Pathetically Desperate...

...If they are reading this blog because they think the bloggerette is hot.